Cognitive Bias (published March 10, 2026)

​My wife once told me that I am very biased in my opinions.  Ok, it’s maybe more than once.  On such occurrences, my typical and not very well thought out response is something along the lines of: Of course I’m bias; I’m always right.  I’ll let you conclude for yourself how those conversations play out.  What’s perhaps even more interesting is how she will later tell me how predictable my initial and eventual follow-on responses are. She has a knack of knowing what I am going to say, before I even say it.  In this regard, you could say that I am a creature of habit. I have a pre-programed built-in response…at least until I eventually wise up and realize I have made a bad decision in expressing such a strong opinion all the time!

In professional aviation, we are also creatures of habit. That’s normally a good thing.  We have specific preflight routines. We utilize detailed checklist that contain specific steps, in specific order. We take off and hover away in a standardized, repetitive way.  We fly over that same geographic feature routinely and check for wires every time. We have mental thought processes that are associated with all of these steps and more.  They are normally met with an expected outcome.  The longer we follow these “routines”, the more solidified they become…routine.  They lead to cognitive biases.  

​Cognitive biases are subconscious mental adaptations that occur when our prior experiences and outcomes create a consistent and thus expected outcome. These biases cause mental perceptions, interpretations and ultimately influence our decisions.  Psychologists call these biases heuristics and again, a good thing. Heuristics are mental shortcuts that aide us in decision making.  Think of it this way.  A student pilot that has not yet developed their so-called routines, has also not yet developed their expected outcomes that follow.  As such, basic aeronautical decision making takes longer.  As that same pilot gains experience, so does their mental adaptations that create cognitive bias for expected outcome. It is these created cognitive biases that result in the brain’s attempt to simplify information processing and speed up problem solving.

​Whereas a cognitive bias can be a good thing, the stronger the bias, the greater the risk of complacency. Sometimes the biases can trip us up, leading to poor decisions and bad judgments.We are so programed for the routine outcome, that we become complacent in verifying the expected outcome. The routine turbine engine start that always has the same outcome, but then one day we miss the abnormal systems reading. The routine takeoff clearance from our home base that is always a specific instruction, but then that odd day that includes a varied instruction that we miss. The valley pass that we routinely fly through that we have never seen wires in, when suddenly one day there is a new wire erected that we miss. The list is as long as is the number of actions and decisions that we make while flying.  The danger is real.

​Cognitive biases can be broadly classified into conscious (explicit) biases, which are intentional and sub-conscious (implicit) biases, which operate automatically without awareness. The FAA further identifies five different types of cognitive bias for better understanding: 1) Expectation Bias – The tendency to perceive or interpret information in a way that aligns preconceived expectation , leading to missed deviations from operational procedures, 2) Confirmation Bias – The tendency to seek out or interpret information that confirms one’s beliefs or preconceived notions, while ignoring or discounting evidence that contradicts them, 3) Plan Continuation Error – The tendency to continue a planned action despite evidence of a potential failure or failure to continue the action, 4) Automation Error – The tendency to rely too heavily on automated systems or tools, leading to a lack of attention to the environment or the need to take action and 5) Automaticity – The tendency to rely on automatic responses or behaviors, which can lead to complacency and reduced attention to critical information.  All five of these cognitive biases carry similar risks and have similar mitigation.

​The most important mitigation tool in countering the risk is simply knowing that they exist and understanding when you might be susceptible. This takes a deliberate approach.  Ask yourself these questions on your next flight. Am I actually verifying the expected outcome, or just blindly trusting it. Am I actually reading and comprehending the systems gauge, or just giving a cursory glance? Am I actually clearing the rotor or just turning my head in motion.

​Even better is the proactive approach in which we force ourselves to mentally assume that we are missing something.  What wire am I not yet seeing?  Flying over that same routine geographic feature with an attitude that even though I have checked for wires here a hundred times and not ever seen one, I am going to continue to check assuming that one day there will indeed be a new wire there.  Its not the hazard that you see that it going to kill you, it’s the one you don’t see.  What hazard is present that you are not yet seeing!? There is a significant difference in flying with this type of deliberate proactive safeguard attitude, versus the blind “routine” expected outcomes attitude.

​Cognitive biases are not just tied to aviation, but literally everything and everyone that we interact with…to include in my case, my lovely wife.  She knows me all too well and to the point where I have caused her to have expected outcomes from me.   I am thinking the next time I might just change my response…catch her off guard and see if I can prove this whole cognitive bias in a positive way!

Mechanical Versuse Human Failure…Data Reversal? (published January, 2026)

In the past fifty-five plus years we have had more than a ten-fold reduction in our commercial helicopter accident rate. Think about that for a minute. Not twice as good, but more than ten times better than we used to be. This is a good thing and clearly demonstrates that our safety efforts over the decades work. The proof is in the data. When we review periods before 1970, we find accident rates that averaged approximately 38.4 accidents per 100,000 flight hours. Today, our commercial helicopter industry over the last 10 years has averaged approximately 3.88 accidents per every 100,000 flight hours (FAA Rotorcraft Accident Dashboard). Big difference…1043% improvement difference to be exact.

Here is a different spin on the same data:   If you were a 10,000-hour pilot in the late1960’s, your personal share of the accident rate would average out to 3.84 accidents for just you yourself. The same 10,000-hour pilot today would only have a .068% chance of being involved in just one accident. Now it clearly does not work this way in the real world as there are so many other variables that come into play, but still a unique way to illustrate just how far we have come in reducing our accident rates.

When looking at the fatal rates we have also improved, but not as significantly as the non-fatal accident rate. In the early 1970’s the rate was 2.93 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours. The fatal accident rate of the last 10 years has averaged .68 accidents per 100,000 flight hours. That is an approximate 430% improvement. This is also a good thing, but a clearly lower rate of improvement when compared to overall accidents.

What has been the greatest source of improvement? This is where it starts to get interesting. When we look at the cause of accidents 50+ years ago we find many sources that indicate some type of mechanical failure in close to 90% of the accidents. In contrast, today the mechanical failure causation accounts for less than 10% of the overall accidents. This significant improvement can undoubtedly be attributed to improvements in aircraft technologies…both in how we build and maintain aircraft today. Today’s modern aircraft are designed, engineered, and manufactured very differently. They are built on the assembly line with different processes and even different materials. Our technical support and maintenance of aircraft have drastically improved as well. The results…significant improvements in mechanical failure rates. While the hard accident data shows drastic improvements, there are actual people that are responsible for it. I commend the aviation engineers, manufacturers, technicians, and mechanics…you are the unsung heroes in our aviation accident reduction statistics. Thank you for making us all so much safer!

Dig deeper. On the converse, the operational human factor causation now accounts for as high as 90% of today’s accidents. Although the current percentage varies depending on what resource is used, it pales when compared to the approximate 10% human factor causation when we look back 50+ years ago. Think about this for a minute…this is essentially a complete reversal in the data. We have gone from a 90% mechanical, and 10% human factor failure split 50+ years ago…to now just the opposite with 10% mechanical and 90% human factor.

This does not mean the operational human factor side has gotten worse; not at all. While keeping in mind that the overall accident rates have decreased down ten-fold, the operational human factor has also gotten much better…just not at the same improvement rate as the mechanical side. There has been drastic improvement on all fronts, with the most impressive clearly being on the technology and technology support side. This is not to say that one is better than the other…or is it? While the data clearly supports the fact that engineers, manufactures, technicians and mechanics are clearly doing their part in making us safer, it also shows that the operational side, in comparison, has plenty of room for improvement.

What does that improvement look like? More importantly, what does the data say it needs to look like. That’s easy. If as many as 90% of our accidents are human factor caused, then human factors clearly need to be the largest focus. The same data shows that the types of human factors caused accidents are not new. In other words, we have not found new human factor related ways to crash helicopters…just not enough ways to stop them.

Perhaps we can learn from the mechanical side of the house that has undoubtedly led the way in having the biggest impact for accident reductions. While there are no surprises here, one standout observation is how the mechanical failure improvements rates have been so gradual. There are no big spike years or singular technological developments that appear to have caused the shift. Over the past 50+ years, the data graphs clearly show consistent gradual improvement. One could easily surmise that a focus on continuous improvement will result in continual improvement. If we are indeed not having new causes of accidents, then we indeed just need to have continual improvements at stopping the known causes which are now at approximately 90%. And what does that look like? Again, that is easy. It's a steadfast improvement in what we know is the ultimate root cause of human factor failures…hazardous attitudes, poor decision-making, and lapses in professionalism. We know it works. The data shows it; we just need to focus on it. Again, no big surprises…just a new spin on data to help us re-focus.

We have made tremendous strides in improving our commercial accidents rates in the last 50+ years and we should all be proud of this data. We all benefit, but at the same time we can all collectively all do better. Until which time we have data that shows zero accidents, we all can stand room to improve in our safety focus.

False Claims that Unknowingly Cost Lives (published November 2025)

Earlier this year, I had the opportunity to attend an international search and rescue conference; a gathering that included representatives from more than 60 different SAR teams representing 28 countries from around the world. The conference itself included all aspects of mountain rescue to include ground-based and aviation-based systems, as well as the integration of both together. To no surprise, this included multiple lectures on the utilization of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. What was surprising was the pervasive mood amongst the UAS operators that today’s UAS’s are capable of replacing manned helicopter systems. Although I, and I would suspect most of the readers here, would not agree with such a bold sentiment today, we all realize the future technology is rapidly evolving and to the point where one day…well who knows. But is it realistic to adopt such a mindset today, even if indirect?

We all at times make exaggerated claims in aviation, both on the unmanned and manned side of operations. Many of the claims are perhaps in good jest, while at other times they can be rooted in ignorance and even ego. Some of these claims on the unmanned side have directly caused a reduction in the use of manned services and in some cases the delay/elimination of request for manned services all together. It is this latter that is perhaps most alarming. It represents an aspect that demands a closer look from a safety-first perspective.

One of the conference presentations on UAS’s included an emotional re-telling of a recent rescue in which a male hiker/climber had become essentially “cliffed-out”. In simple terms, the victim could no longer easily climb up or down the steep terrain…he was stuck. The young man had set out earlier that morning and was climbing alone. Upon realizing his challenging situation of being cliffed-out, he called his parents and advised his predicament. The young man told his dad of his precarious situation, but also that he was going to be ok. His dad convinced his son to please call him back within the hour to let him know that he had made it out and was indeed still ok.

After not hearing from his son in the prescribed time, the dad expectedly became very anxious and alerted the local SAR authorities. The SAR team responded and began a search of the area as appropriate, to include the utilization of two very capable UAS operators. A helicopter response was not requested at the onset. It would be one of the individual UAS operators that in time located the victim’s backpack and eventually the victim himself. While hovering the UAV near the victim, the operator would report that the victim was indeed alive and conscious but also appeared to be severely injured from a fall. Two different UAV’s would be utilized to direct the ground rescuers to the site, one of which would eventually be utilized to illuminate the now nighttime rescue scene.

Once the ground team eventually accessed the challenging location of the victim, it was determined that an immediate helicopter rescue and medical evacuation was indeed needed. The local SAR helicopter was now called in for a nighttime rescue, albeit several hours after the original SAR request. The helicopter rescue was performed without incident, and the victim was immediately transported to the hospital. Tragically, the young victim was pronounced deceased a short time later. The earlier cell phone call between a son and father had been their last.

In the case of this heartfelt tragic story above, why wasn’t a crewed helicopter called in sooner? Was it a mindset that UAS are capable of replacing manned helicopters? Could a helicopter, with three sets of human eyes and an even more robust camera system, have found the victim sooner than one set of eyes looking at a small hand-held UAS screen? Could a helicopter crew have performed the rescue immediately and in the daylight? Would the victim potentially have survived having arrived at the trauma center earlier? Did a mindset of unmanned versus manned indirectly and unknowingly cause a delay in victim rescue and medical care? The purpose of this story is not to determine one way or the other to these questions…and is certainly not to cast a blame. It is told to bring to light the real-world reality of today’s UAS, versus manned helicopters. For this story we will never know with certainty the answers to these tough questions.

What we do know is this. UAS are very capable systems, and they should absolutely be utilized, to include in missions like the one described here….but so should manned helicopters. Individually and/or collectively when able, they both clearly broaden the ability of operations in all segments, to include this SAR example. They make us more capable. But at the same time, is the real-world deployment of UAS’s to the point of legitimately being able to replace the crewed helicopter? In my mind, not even close….especially not in this type of application.

Again, UAS are very capable systems and should be utilized. But with current performance deltas, they are nowhere close to being able to eliminate the crewed helicopter. Until which times and individual UAV can have competing payload, range, endurance and weather ability, both are critically needed. The reality is that today the unmanned and manned systems are two distinctly different systems. A small UAV cannot fully replace the mission of a manned helicopter, any more than a manned helicopter cannot fully perform all of the functions that a UAV can. Unmanned systems and manned systems are a great complement to each other and collectively broaden the mission capability of aviation as a whole.

To even indirectly make false claims that “today’s” commercial UAS can replace crewed aviation is not realistic. It is also not safety first…not even close. And in the case of this SAR example, it is presumably not even a smart mission decision. To claim that UAS should replace crewed aviation is not only dangerous, but also potentially costing us human life.

What We Permit, We Promote (published September, 2025)

I recently read the transcript from a NTSB Investigative Hearing relating to a helicopter accident that occurred earlier this year.  The formal findings and recommendations from this accident are not yet finalized, therefore identifying this specific accident is premature.  That said, what some of the initial transcript's reveal is startling.

The details and preliminary findings are numerous, as one might expect.  However, the startling and unmistakable takeaway is the deficiencies that were known to have existed prior to this tragic accident that resulted in the loss of life for several individuals.  Known risks that had been identified but presumably ignored.  It is horrible to think that although the accident was tragic when it took place, it was perhaps not unexpected for some.  Individuals were aware of the deficiencies and presumably come have acted, but for whatever reason did not in an effective way.  The question then, is why not?

As alarming as this may be, it is unfortunately not overly uncommon.  There are many accident reports in which we read of indirect testimony indicating that deficiencies existed, were known, but were not acted on beforehand.  In multiple reports testimony can be found in which the colleague knew that the involved crew member had tendencies to take risks, yet never properly confronted them. One report of this nature documents a pilot flagrantly “hotdogging” just prior to the fatal crash.  The so-called hotdogging aspects were documented as being known beforehand by multiple sources, none of which had taken effective actions beforehand.  What is perhaps most ironic in these reports is that the findings never seem to highlight those who failed to act beforehand. Instead, their testimony is typically utilized to point the finger of responsibility to the one that was involved in the accident.  In the case of the hotdogging pilot, the official cause of the accident was “loss of aircraft control” on the part of the pilot and with no mention of the known sources as potential preventative measures.  We can do better.

It's been said that what we permit, we promote; and those things we allow ourselves to tolerate, we don't change.  In these above examples, we are effectively permitting known deficiencies to slip by.  We’re tolerating thins that should be changed.  When we refuse to confront safety and performance shortcomings, we are not only permitting it, by default we are also promoting it.  We are tolerating things that need to be changed.   

We all have expectations for ourselves, as well as those we work with.  If someone were to ask us what we expect from those around us, we would likely state expectations for both performance and safety. But are those stated expectations the reality of what we are seeing?  Are we at times permitting something less?  There is more often than not a significant difference in what we expect, versus what we permit, or allow.  The same question applies as we look at ourselves.  Perhaps the better question to ask is, “what are we permitting or tolerating” from those around us and with ourselves?  The reality is that what we permit...is what we will get.  By default, it becomes your operational culture.  Our job as leaders and coworkers is to align what we expect and with what we permit...with zero gaps.

But I’m not in leadership?  Do you find yourself saying the likes of, “I’m not responsible for that person” or perhaps “that's not my job to watch over them”...”they don’t pay me enough to do that”?  That may very well be…but try telling that to the survivors who lost loved ones in the above-mentioned accidents.  In the investigative hearing, one surviving family member is quoted as saying, “Are you kidding me?” and “That makes me so angry” when learning that the discrepancies were known by multiple sources before the accident.  We owe it to these survivors, to each other and to ourselves to speak up when we know of shortcomings.  Aviation is too inherently dangerous not to.  Doing the right thing does not just pertain to leadership, it pertains to all of us.

Although we all have expectations; there tends to be a gap between our expectations and what we tolerate.  Why do we tolerate these gaps?  Why do we continue to permit what we know is an unacceptable risk?  Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs and our innate desire for a sense of belongingness can perhaps shed light on the tendencies as to why we allow these gaps, as a means to overcome:

Avoid confrontation.  We all like to be liked.  When faced with the need to confront someone on a known shortcoming, we typically perceive the confrontation as potentially exposing ourselves to disagreement, defensiveness, argument and even rejection.  Although those negative aspects can be and are potentially real, so is the potential tragic results of not confronting.  When it comes to aviation safety, acting on known shortcomings is perhaps one of the most caring things that we can do.

Look the other way.  At times our subconscious will default to “looking the other way” as a means of avoiding the mental stress of deciding whether or not to act.  Looking the other way in aviation safety is perhaps just as foolish as the child who wrongly thinks the embarrassment is gone if they cover their eyes.  We would never look the other way with a known hazard facing us in the cockpit…yet at times we do it when the hazard is indirectly impacting someone else and not ourselves.

Rationalize it.  At times we actually create full internal dialogues of why we shouldn't get involved and even to the point of creating hypothetical stories of what we think might happen or not happen. This is a dangerous slope when we tell ourselves stories that in effect let people off the hook.  Instead, interject your own story. Is your story enabling people to behave badly in terms of safety risks?  How does that story portray yourself? 

Letting your expectations slide is easier and offers less resistance…in the short term.  When the potential risk materializes into a tragic accident, it is anything but easier.   Promoting safety expectations takes work and discipline. Regardless of the many reasons as to why we accept bad traits and circumstances...by permitting them, we are effectively promoting them.  Promote safety...by not permitting or tolerating anything less.  

The Ability and Inability to Compartmentalize (published July, 2025)

“I am good to go…I can compartmentalize this stuff”.  This was the pilot’s response when asked if he was ok to fly.  A friend had asked the question following a conversation in which the pilot had explained what seemed to be a very stressful, emotional family situation that he was going through.  “Besides, flying is a good distraction from it”, the pilot added.  Later that night the pilot encountered inadvertent IMC and was killed.

More than one year later, spatial disorientation and loss of aircraft control were listed as the official cause of the accident.  Poor weather decisions, inattention to changing conditions and a number of additional factors played a role as well.  Alleviate any of those failures and the accident likley would have been prevented...or not?  With these types of accidents, we really never know the root cause of the tragedy with certainty.   Although the “friend” in this story and all of us for that matter will never know what exactly precipitated the inadvertent IMC, the presumed mental state and stress of the pilots’ family situation were potentially likley factors as well.

Was the pilot actually able to “compartmentalize” what was happening within his family from what he needed to happen within the cockpit?  Was his full decision-making ability impacted?  Was the flying a distraction from the personal issues…or was the personal issues actually a distraction to the flying?

Compartmentalizing is said to be a mental strategy that involves dividing our thoughts, emotions, or experiences into distinct mental “compartments” to manage them more efficiently. We all utilize compartmentalization at times.  Sometimes it serves as a defense mechanism to avoid dealing with conflict.  Other times we compartmentalize so that we can prioritize.  For example, the worker who leaves the office at the end of the day and refuses to think about work for the rest of the evening so that they can enjoy time away from work.  To a greater degree, the soldier who files away the trauma of horrific events so that he or she can continue on in battle.  In both this simple and more extreme example, there is an obvious benefit to compartmentalizing.

But does it work in aviation?  While there are no shortage of studies and examples that tout the psychological benefit of mental compartmentalizing in the short-term, there can also be downsides.  At the forefront of the downside is the negative impact of emotional suppression and avoidance of underlying issues in the long-term.  We know that these long-term issues also have the potential to impact other mental and physical functions; but are we able to separate the short-term benefit from the long-term negative impact?  Is there an impact on other cognitive functions?  Are we really at 100% capacity when we compartmentalize a stressful situation?

These are tough questions to answer.  For most of us, the answers are likley dependent on the perceived severity of what it is that we are trying to mentally silo.  For example, a bad day in the office, is not the same as a horribly bad breakup.  Our ability to compartmentalize each is likley also not the same.  So are we deemed safe to fly in one scenario and not the other?  Again it’s not an easy question to answer…or is it?

Let’s ask it this way.  Would we ever accept a critical piece of equipment in the aircraft if it was not at full capacity?   If a cockpit system fails a BIT and indicates less than 100%, would we still accept it?  Likley not.  So then why do we at times think that we as the pilot or technician think that we are good to go, when we know full well that we are not at 100%?

We are going to have bad days.  Bad days are expected.  We go through seasons of life.  It’s ok to have a bad day.  As the saying goes, “it’s ok to not be ok”…but it is never ok to knowingly not be okay when piloting or working on an aircraft. 

Remember what the “S” and “E” stand for in the IMSAFE checklist? Here’s a reminder of the full checklist:  Illness (do I have symptoms?), Medication (Am I taking any medications that could impair my ability to fly?), Stress (Am I under any stress that could effect my performance?), Alcohol (Have I consumed alcohol in the last 8 hours?), Fatigue (Am I well-rested and alert?) and Emotion (Am I emotionally stable and fit to fly?).  This checklist helps us to ensure we are not impaired by any of these factors…to include stress and emotion.  But are we being honest with ourselves and those around us?  Is the stress and emotion perhaps causing loss of sleep and thus a fatigue?  That alone equates to 50% of the IMSAFE checklist.  It actually becomes careless, reckless and even illegal for us to not acknowledge even one of the yes’s in IMSAFE.  Can we really think that we are still good to go and can simply compartmentalize stress, emotion and fatigue?

Am I really “good to go” despite all I have going on?  Do I hear myself saying “I can compartmentalize this stuff” or maybe “flying helps me take my mind off of it”? “ Its no big deal, I need the distraction. My team needs me.  There isn’t anyone else that can fill in for me.”  These and statements like them are typical responses when we are questioned if we are safe to fly.  We owe it to ourselves and others to complete a sincere self-check before we get in the cockpit on days like this.  Be honest with yourself.  Remember, it is ok to not be ok…but is never ok to do so with the aircraft. 

It's Not the Hazard You See that Will Hurt You (published June, 2025)

Earlier this year, we all read with shock about the horrible midair collision between a military helicopter and a commercial airliner.  While we await the investigation completion and formal reports, what we know with certainty is that 67 lives were tragically and unexpectedly lost.  Regardless of the eventual final reports, the loss of life is factually known and will undoubtedly not change.  This aspect alone is now part of our aviation accident history. 

Our aviation accident history is unfortunately not void of other midair collisions.  Although formal historical studies are conflicting on the actual numbers, according to the official NTSB accident database, there were 131 midair collisions in the last 15 years for the U.S. alone.  This represents less than 1% of all reported aircraft accidents, not surprising.  Also not surprising is the high fatality rate as a standout factor within midair collisions, which is listed at over 50%.  There are only three other “defining events” amongst accident categories that carry such a high fatality rate.  These include loss of control in flight, controlled flight into terrain and unintended flight into IMC.

Although the various global studies vary in formal numbers, a snapshot look at individual midair accident reports themselves show similar and interesting findings.  In a personal informal research, 37 random midair reports from within the last 25 years were looked at from around the world.  Of the 37 reported, 11 were purely military and 26 involved at least one civilian aircraft.  Mid-air collisions involving two fixed wing aircraft had the highest rate with 24 of the 37.  There were 9 mid-airs involving both a fixed wing and a helicopter and four involved just helicopters.

Collectively there were 432 lives lost in the 37 midair collisions.  Only one of the 37 did not involve fatalities.   The midair collisions occurred in 18 different countries, with the United States having the largest share with 16 of the 37.  Germany and Australia reported three each, with the remaining spread over 15 different countries.  Of 13 mid-airs involving at least one helicopter, seven different helicopter OEM’s were included.  The mix of OEM’s included a further mix of light, medium and heavy lift helicopters.  The civilian helicopter breakdown included private, commercial, and parapublic with a wide mission type variety.

It is important to point out that this analysis was informal.  However, from this simple data one can easily conclude that no one aircraft category, mission type, aircraft type, aircraft size or major geographic region that is immune from a potential mid-air collision.  Perhaps worst of all is how the data shows just how deadly these collisions are.

While we do not know the cause of the most recent and nor should we speculate until investigations are complete, we do know that collectively the 25-year history shows the bulk of the mid-airs involved some level of see and avoid lapses. In reading the various historical reports, the involved aircrews did not see the other aircraft hazard in time to avoid the collisions, with some undoubtedly not being seen at all.

While we await the formal reports from the most recent mid-air, what can we take-away today?  Minimally a reminder, that it is likley not the aircraft that we see that will hurt us, it is the aircraft that we don’t see that we will potentially collide with.  The same can be said for perhaps any hazard.  For example, it is not the wire that we see that is going to hurt us, it is the wire that we don’t see that we need to worry more about. 

Although there are technologies that can and do help us guard against midair collisions, the see and avoid techniques should always remain as a baseline.   TCAS systems while mandated in most commercial aircraft, are not mandated in general aviation aircraft.  Although ADS-B “Out” is now mandated in many regions, the ADS-B “In” functions are not mandated.  As such, see and avoid in many cases is left as the only means of midair collision avoidance.  This is especially the case for general aviation on VFR flights.   

In the U.S., FAR 91.113 describes “see and avoid” as a method for avoiding collision when weather conditions permit and requires that pilots should actively search for potentially conflicting traffic”.  The FAR specifically states, “vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid”.  EASA regulation is very similar.  In April of just this year, EASA launched an initiative to encourage operators to voluntarily utilize conspicuity devices to include ADS-B out, ADS-L and similar for the general aviation community.  The same EASA initiative focused on technology providers and the establishment of ADS-L standards and systems for light aviation and even drones.  While technology can be and is a great asset for preventing midair collisions, see and avoid remains a critical asset.

Regardless of final outcomes on this latest tragic midair collision, our hearts and prayers go out to the victims.  At the same time, we can do our part to prevent it from happening again.  We can enhance our detection abilities with technologies, even if not yet mandated.  We can be reminded of see and avoid criticalness.  We can operate in a manner in which proactively look for what we are not yet seeing, as our best means to avoid it.  It’s not just the other aircraft or hazard that you see that you will potentially collide with, it’s the one you don’t see.  See, avoid and…be safe!

There Are Very Few People that I Like... (published March, 2025)

I recently asked an influential member of our helicopter industry what his “thoughts” were regarding the personnel within his aviation organization.  “Well, truth be told, there are actually very few people here that I like”.  What?  Never mind that this individual was in a prominent position within the helicopter industry, this was a very interesting response to say the least.  Admittedly I was expecting some type of response indicating how much he loved his people, or how great they were, or minimally something more positive.  Instead, it was the attention getting, “not many people here that I like”.  What an odd answer…or was it?

Within the academic setting, we are commonly asked what are the most effective traits that leaders and team members need to possess are?  This is undoubtedly a subjective question in which there is likley no stand-alone answer.  For example, ask any random group this question and you will likely get as many different answers.  Ask this same question to the most effective leaders and team members and you will likley get a more common answer that trends to a “love of people” type of response.  Whereas this love of people response might be perceived as a touchy-feely type, it is anything but.  At the same time, the above “dislike of people” was ultimately not said in a negative way that it was initially perceived as.

In full, the individual’s response above was, “Well truth be told, there are actually very few people here that I like…but as for people here as a whole, I think the world of them”.  He further explained that he indeed had a true passion for his people, passionately cared for them to be safe, and truly wanted them to excel as crew members and technicians.  In his words, “I love them, I just don’t want to hang out with them”.  He added that the majority of his people likely didn’t like him either.  Touche!  But his popularity was not important to him, his genuine love for the people to be safe and productive as an organization was what was important.

There are no shortage of academic studies that indicate some of the highest traits amongst successful teams and organizations is a true caring for their fellow workers and team members.  We can see this time and time again in the real world; the military and parapublic settings being great examples.  The special forces team member that would go to any length stems out of a brotherly love of each other.  The police squad that is so collectively cohesive, that they passionately rush to back each other up in dangerous situations.  But yet at the same time it is not uncommon to find individuals within these teams that don’t necessarily get along with every member of the whole team.  For some, they perhaps don’t like them on the personal level, but yet they will rally around them in the name of mission and safety.  They actively care for them all as being part of their team, but don’t always want to hang out with them all. 

How does this apply to aviation safety?  When we truly care for each other we are more apt to create environments of “psychological safety”.  Per numerous CRM doctrines, when we feel psychological safe, we are more likely to speak up, challenge each other and share information…critical traits within aviation safety.  According to a Gallup research, it was found that leadership and team environments that foster psychological safety, have 76% more direct engagement.  However, in additional studies to include one from Harvard, only 25% of workplace environments have deliberate efforts to create the caring psychological safety environment.  In another 20-year study, it was reported that 72% of team members actually strived to avoid conflict, resulting in a mere 48% chance that they would speak truth to shortcomings amongst each other.  On the converse, when the psychological safety was reported as present in the workplace, there was a 90% chance that they would speak candidly to each other.

What does this look like in our aviation setting?  It can be as simple as telling each other want we need to hear and not just what we want to hear…critical to our aviation safety.  What we permit, we promote.  When is the last time you saw one of your colleagues not truly being “safety first” but yet you didn’t call him or her out on it?  How about the colleague that you know is going through a tough time emotionally for whatever reason, yet you didn’t take the time to ensure that they were fit to fly.  Its ok to have a bad day, it happens.  But it is never ok to knowingly allow a bad day in the cockpit or on the hanger floor.   Confronting each other on safety shortcomings, doesn’t mean that we have to like them, want to hang out with them or even need to know why the bad day, but their safety and yours might just depend on that you care enough for them as people to respectively confront them regardless.  If we are not willing to talk to each other and challenge each other when we need to, then our safety culture is weakened at best.  

How we live and work across our teams and boundaries is perhaps one of the best safety tools that we can have.  When we truly care about each other as team members, we want the best for them and are more willing to confront shortcomings in ourselves and in each other.  What we tolerate, we will likely never change.  We have to be willing to talk to each other, speak up to each other and stop each other when we need to.  As for the responders point above, we don’t necessarily have to like them or even hang out with them, but we can still care for them.

Startle Response...One Incident, Two Reactions (published January, 2025)

The helicopter crew was halfway home on an hour-long flight.  They had just completed a mission that had extended late into the night and early morning hours.  The weather was clear, the winds still and the moon bright as the aircraft cruised at an approximate altitude of 1000’ AGL.  The tenured crew consisted of a pilot in the right front seat and a tactical medic in the front left seat, both under night vision goggles.  They were self-described as very relaxed and with little expectation other than an uneventful quiet flight back to base.

Suddenly and without warning, the crew experienced multiple loud bangs and a violent rush of air and debris in the cockpit.  Both crewmembers described the moment as startling, completely unexpected and chaotic.  For the tactical medic, it included an instant blindness and the feeling of moisture on his flight suit and face.  He later would report that he thought he had been shot by gunfire and although his outward actions were calm, he self-described an inner sense of panic.

The pilot still able to visually see, was initially very unclear as to what had happened, but knew he needed to assess and fly the aircraft first.  It was this started yet calm response in which he assessed that the aircraft had good power, good stability and the need for himself to stay calm.  He flew the aircraft.  He soon realized that the rush of air was from a broken chin bubble on the left side of the aircraft, and that he needed to land.  He continued to show calm through the deliberate verbal narration of his actions and observations to his fellow crewmember.

The tactical medic would later state that he was reassured by the calm demeanor of the pilot, despite his inability to initially see him sitting right next to him. While completing a quick self-assessment of any injury to himself, he simultaneously initiated an emergency radio call to the dispatch center.  His formal and then recurrent training had reinforced the need for the critical call upon any emergency.  It had become a rote action, even when he did not fully know or understand what had happened.  As a result, the flight dispatcher knew their location and need for help, even before the aircraft had landed.

Once on the ground, the pilot confirmed his suspicion of bird strike.  It was not just one bird, but six full sized ducks that had violently and unexpectedly struck the helicopter, thus the multiple loud bangs.  One of the six striking birds had come thru the aircrafts chin bubble, dislodging a flurry of dust and debris that had been left uncleaned during preflight.  The flight paramedics temporary blindness had been caused by this debris, as well as parts of the bird carcass. 

There had been no warning as neither crewmember had been able to detect the night flying ducks.  They were not in a known high bird activity area.  Outside of accepting an aircraft that was full of excessive dust in the chin bubble area during their preflight, the crew was perhaps textbook in managing the unexpected event.  Although their respective startled reactions were both different, collectively they landed safely and without further incident or injury.

How would you have managed in the same situation?  What if instead of birds, it was an engine failure, perhaps partial engine failure?  A sudden door opening in flight, or other sudden startling event?  What if it was an incapacitated crewmember or perhaps a passenger causing an unexpected distraction?  What if it was suddenly the unexpected?

According to the Federal Aviation Administration, flight crews are subject to what is called the “startle response”, when they are faced with unexpected emergency situations.  The so-called startle response can cause a delay in action or at times the initiation of an inappropriate action in response to the emergency.  Per the FAA, the most common factor in startle response failure is loss of aircraft control, in situations in which aircraft control should have still been possible.  Training and preparation can reduce startle response time and promote more effective and timely responses to emergencies.  Training, to include simple chair flying and simulator flying can reduce the potential danger.

The European Aviation Safety Agency refers to the need for “startle effect management”.  In a 2015 research study carried out by EASA, they report that startle and surprise effects can influence pilot performance in many detrimental ways: from mere distraction, to inappropriate actions or hasty decision making.  Well-learned procedures and skills can be discarded and substituted by inappropriate reactions, including freezing or over-reacting at the controls.  EASA concluded the study with agreement that training paradigms are essential to include the need for specific mental upset training.  

Flight crews are subject to startle response when faced with unexpected events, such  as those described in the examples above.  Heart rate increases, adrenaline increases, breathing rate increases and stress levels go up.  These human reactions can be good as they keep us alert and can improve our performance.  But if it exceeds the ability to cope or not properly controlled, decision-making and situational awareness is impaired.  In the worse cases, freezing and doing nothing can lead to the eventual crash. 

Being prepared to manage the unexpected includes solid initial training, structured recurrent training, and practice beyond just what is required.  It includes mental preparedness and mental practice.  It also includes a solid understanding of your aircraft, its systems and how they work…and what to do when they don’t work.  Most importantly it includes the discipline and professionalism to strive for greater proficiency on every task, to include the need for emergency tasks that startle us.  Don’t get caught by surprise when the unexpected happens.  Even if you do not know fully know what is happening, controlling the aircraft is always primary.  Fly the aircraft first; it’s part of safety first.